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AD HOC IAC COMMITTEE (WATCH)

Transcript of Meeting Held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 11 December 1953

Mr. Huntington D. Sheldon
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William C. Trueheart, Office of the Special Assistant,
Intelligence, Department of State

Brigadier General John M. Willems, Deputy AC of S, G-2,
Department of the Army

Captain D. T. Eller (USN), Assistant Head, Intelligence
Branch, ONI, Department of the Navy

Brigadier General Millard Lewis, Deputy Director Intelli-
gence, Headquarters USAF, United States Air Force

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, Intelligence Division, Atomic
Energy Commission

Captain E. T. Layton (USN), Joint Intelligence Group, The
Joint Staff

Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, Special Agent, Liaison Section,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Colonel George R. Hundt, United States Air Force

Colonel Howard D. Kenzie, United States Air Force

Mr. Samuel S. Rockwell, United States Air Force

25X1A

[REDACTED] Office of Current Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency, Acting Secretary

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[REDACTED] Reporter

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MR. SHELDON: I guess Mr. Kuhrtz is coming. We haven't heard any word to the contrary. Why don't we inquire as to whether there are any changes in the Minutes as circulated, and we will ask him the same question when he comes in.

MR. REICHARDT: I had wanted to talk to Mr. Kuhrtz because I possibly put words in his mouth here, but I had in mind that on page 5 we should clarify my language of fluency and change from "and possible FBI activities" to "and possibly also FBI activities".

MR. SHELDON: Why don't you get together with him on that, and then we can go back to that at the end?

DR. REICHARDT: Even this I don't think would necessarily commit him to any course of action, and then follow up the whole sentence after "full-time representatives" with "to the Working Group for these Agencies", and let this be dependent upon his views also.

MR. SHELDON: That is on page 5, fourth item.

DR. REICHARDT: I think those two clarifications would not commit the FBI.

MR. SHELDON: Yes. Any other comments on the Minutes?

MR. TRUEHEART: I don't have any corrections, but I think there is a certain ambiguity on the first page in connection with this all-source business. Perhaps the discussion itself was ambiguous, but it was certainly my feeling that we had put over the question of all-source or whatever kind of reporting until we come to the detailed operating procedures. In other words, it was my understanding that Captain Layton's statement here really was the sense of the meeting.

MR. SHELDON: In other words, really we should interchange those two statements? In other words, it was the sense of the meeting as I recall it that Captain Layton's recommendation provided for all contingencies which we would deal with in detail subsequently.

MR. TRUEHEART: Right, that this was neutral with respect to the exact type of reporting, that is, the thing we agreed to was neutral on the question of reporting. I don't think we need to correct these past Minutes. If that

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is agreed we could just have it in these Minutes, if that was the sense.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I don't believe I quite follow you.

MR. TRUEHEART: I am on page 1.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes.

MR. TRUEHEART: Your statement, and then the Chairman stated "that he presumed the proposed paragraph provided for all-source reporting, either orally or in written form." I thought there was no such inference to be drawn from the statement, from the agreed paragraph itself, that it was neutral on the question of what kind of reporting the Watch Committee was going to do.

MR. SHELDON: If we rewrote that to say "was broad enough to cover" that would solve your problem, wouldn't it, instead of "provided for"?

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes, although I think you are fully entitled to any presumptions you like. I don't want to put words in your mouth, which is what I would be doing by changing this sentence.

MR. SHELDON: All I was addressing myself to in that question, I wanted to be sure the language was broad enough to include it if and when we decided that was the proper way to proceed.

MR. TRUEHEART: That is exactly what I thought.

MR. SHELDON: So I will take care of amending that to take care of your comment which I think is quite just. [REDACTED] you take care of that. 25X1A

25X1A [REDACTED] Yes, sir.

(At this point Mr. Kuhrtz entered the room.)

MR. SHELDON: Dr. Reichardt had a little question on page 5 which had an implication with respect to you, Mr. Kuhrtz, and since we are on the Minutes, we might as well get that cleared up right away.

MR. KUHERTZ: Yes, he just mentioned that to me, Mr. Sheldon, here on the side, and it is O.K. with me the way --

MR. SHELDON: The way he recommended the change?

MR. KUHERTZ: Yes.

MR. SHELDON: All right. Does anybody have --

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DR. REICHARDT: I just did not want to commit the FBI on it.

MR. SHELDON: All right, then with the amendments as accepted the Minutes as circulated stand approved. Before we swing into the main discussion here, I think we might just address ourselves to the question of whether we want to meet at any other time other than Friday the next two weeks because our normal meeting day falls on a Friday, and they are both Christmas and New Years days, and obviously the Agency certainly won't be in full swing at that point. Do we want to consider a different meeting day those particular weeks, or do you want to skip? What do you feel? Do you feel we have made adequate progress to take a small breather, or shall we proceed Wednesday, or Thursday, or any day that suits you? Does anybody have any strong views?

GENERAL WILLEMS: If you put it that way I am willing to speak up. I should think it would be very appropriate if we sort of had a yuletide holiday.

MR. TRUEHEART: I share those views.

DR. REICHARDT: I would certainly appreciate it from the standpoint of my schedule.

MR. SHELDON: Does anybody have any strong contrary views?

MR. TRUEHEART: You are not speaking of next week though -- the week following.

MR. SHELDON: That is right. I was just looking ahead to see how we stood here. So that the weeks of Christmas and of New Years will be without meetings, and then we will simply resume the first Friday after the new year.

MR. TRUEHEART: I might interject here the report that Allan Evans was operated on last Friday and apparently was successful. He seems to be doing fine. He was going to have an operation on both eyes, one one week and the next one the next week, but they have decided now not to operate on the other eye until next fall.

MR. SHELDON: Until next fall?

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes, sir.

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MR. SHELDON: In any event it is quite a recuperative job, isn't it?

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes, I think they won't actually take the bandages completely off until around the first of the year. He will go home the middle of next week, and they have removed the entire lens from his eye, so that he will have to have a new kind of glasses, and I think probably some training of his eye to use it, but in any case the prospects look as good as they could be expected.

MR. SHELDON: I am glad the first step is successful anyway, and we all wish him luck.

Well, to see if we can clean up a sore spot here, the paramilitary definition we are back on, and we have struggled with this, and my personal recommendation comes back to using only the last sentence. I simply have not been able to find what I would consider or what I would believe to be an acceptable definition to meet all of the views around the table, and on further review I honestly believe that the last sentence of the definition as proposed at the last meeting would satisfy the requirements. I think you all have it in front of you. It would simply read: "In the context of this paper this includes action concerned with clandestine introduction of unconventional weapons within the confines of those areas under the purview of the Watch Committee". That was as amended at the last meeting, and it would seem to me that that is really what we have been talking about.

MR. TRUEHEART: What was that?

MR. SHELDON: "In the context of this paper this includes action concerned with clandestine introduction of unconventional weapons within the confines of those areas under the purview of the Watch Committee."

MR. TRUEHEART: "action concerned with clandestine introduction . . ."?

MR. SHELDON: Now it does not entirely meet Millard's problem of sabotage, and I haven't been able to solve that one. Maybe you have been able to solve it.

GENERAL LEWIS: No, but we will try. I say we can work on it for a week and see.

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MR. SHELDON: You try that.

GENERAL LEWIS: Maybe we can figure out something. I think if we keep trying long enough we will probably get around to something.

MR. SHELDON: As a matter of moving forward at least a small step, can we eliminate the first sentence then and simply devote our attention to the second sentence and see if that can be worked around to satisfy everybody's views? Would that be satisfactory?

(All members of the Committee nodded in the affirmative.)

MR. SHELDON: All right then.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, tentatively maybe, but I think there are some awful good words in that first sentence which might be necessary, however, let us wrestle with it for a while and see. I doubt if we can do any better, but we can try.

MR. SHELDON: I would love to have you try. That brings us to the way in which the "Indications Center" would be manned and operated.

MR. TRUEHEART: Before we get to that, I don't have any changes to make in the draft we have agreed to here, but I do have an addition which I would like to put in on the dissemination thing. It would be a second paragraph to come right after the paragraph that the Committee would report promptly their conclusions. And this is what it is. It isn't too late to -- ?

MR. SHELDON: Oh, heavens, no. I mean for the record I simply don't assume that anything is absolutely definitive at this stage in any event. We have passed over a number of items here which we will have to review in the finale here.

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes. The reason behind this is that (1) it seems to me this is the proper function for the Watch Committee, something they ought to have in mind, and, in the second place, it indirectly makes clear that it isn't a Watch Committee which would be expected to prepare estimates.

MR. SHELDON: I have one question among others. The Departmental Intelligence Estimate, are they normally made available to the Watch Committee? If so, would it be the proper function of the Watch Committee to bring to the

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attention of the IAC as such a departmental estimate? I query that.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think that that is a good point. I am not sure it is proper, and I would be happy to drop it out if it seems inappropriate for them to bring this to the attention of the IAC and simply make it National Intelligence Estimate.

MR. SHELDON: It seems to me that the Departmental Estimate is a private piece of paper which it would not properly be a function of the Watch Committee to bring to the attention of the IAC.

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes, as far as I am concerned I would be glad to drop out that "or Departmental".

CAPTAIN LAYTON: I feel, Mr. Chairman, your remarks are entirely correct, that Departmental is not within the scope of the IAC as it is set up in the NSCID's since their function is national intelligence, that removing Departmental would sharpen this, I think. I would like to indicate perhaps that maybe this looks like they are trying to tell the IAC its business, and I would like to recommend you might say "as appropriate, to indicate" or "to recommend to the IAC". My reason for that is that taking it in its dissemination function you give it more than the dissemination function. You are giving it something that is advisory, administrative, or otherwise, and I believe only the IAC can really determine that one is necessary. They can recommend that it should be reviewed, it should be --

MR. TRUEHEART: That was my intent.

CAPTAIN LAYTON: Put this as a Subcommittee of the IAC they would be telling the IAC how to do their business.

MR. SHELDON: My next question is, does it properly fall under dissemination? I question that.

MR. TRUEHEART: This paragraph doesn't have a heading "Dissemination" does it?

MR. SHELDON: Excepting we have by I thought agreement around the table without so stating it. We were moving -- in other words, your collection, your analysis and evaluation -- to your dissemination without putting a label on

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each paragraph. I think it is self-explanatory as it reads, and here we would be tacking a function -- new function -- on under, in effect, what I would read to be a dissemination procedure.

MR. TRUEHEART: Would it be better to make it paragraph 4 or put it somewhere else?

MR. SHELDON: My next question would be whether it is a function that you want to spell out as one of the functions of the Watch Committee or whether it would be part of the duties of the Working Group to initiate such a recommendation because that is really where the recommendation in large measure would stem from. There it is simply a question of is it as important as the other functions or is it something that as a procedure the Working Group should have in the front of their minds to make those recommendations.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, I don't feel too strongly about it.

MR. SHELDON: I think the idea is something good to put in the paper, and it is a question of where we put it. What is the general view on this, whether this is a function which should be spelled out as, let's say, paragraph 4, or whether we should put it into, in fact, the instructions to the Working Group as part of their responsibility?

CAPTAIN ELLER: I think paragraph 4, this is under C, Functions, would be a good place for it because rather than having it drawn into a Working Group instruction, it loses its --

MR. SHELDON: Force.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Position, and, as Mr. Trueheart pointed out, it also gives to the reader on the first page a clear definition that they are not doing the estimating business, and it would be a function to recommend that the IAC initiate a review or even a new estimate on some area or situation.

MR. SHELDON: Yes, I think that is a point well taken because it is the function of a Watch Committee rather than the Working Group to make the recommendation per se. I think that is right. How do you feel on that?

GENERAL LEWIS: It sounds all right to me. Put it down before Functions.

MR. SHELDON: I think that is all right.

MR. TRUEHEART: It would be recommend rather than indicate.

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MR. SHELDON: I think that is a helpful . . . to recommend as appropriate.

MR. KUERTZ: Yes.

GENERAL WILLEMS: My one concern on this would be are you going to put on the Watch Committee a responsibility for reviewing estimates prepared? It seems to me when the Watch Committee comes up with a recommendation to re-write an estimate they have to know whereof they speak with regards to the existing one, and I just wonder if we couldn't accomplish this in another way by indicating that in addition to indications that they will utilize the national estimates.

MR. SHELDON: I would visualize the Working Group working with National Estimates as their guides, in many respects, of what the intelligence community thought of the likely occurrences of various areas. I couldn't conceive of the Working Group not being thoroughly familiar with the current estimates.

MR. TRUEHEART: Which have a bearing on the watch function.

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

MR. TRUEHEART: And I certainly wouldn't take this to mean that that was the only place where such a recommendation as this would come. Simply it is an additional duty to let them know that they are expected to make such recommendations when they see the need for them or possible need for them.

MR. SHELDON: And would indicate that it would not be the watch function per se to make estimates.

DR. REICHARDT: Could it convey that idea if it were placed down in 1,b?

MR. SHELDON: Let's take a look.

DR. REICHARDT: In other words, it would be sort of an additional function to General Willems' idea of not being a primary function.

MR. SHELDON: Under where?

DR. REICHARDT: Well, we do not have a 1,b, but to follow 1 or 1,a underneath the present 1,first function. In other words, there you are operating an Intelligence Plan "for the levying upon IAC members of the intelligence requirements necessary . . . "

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MR. TRUEHEART: I am inclined to think that puts it up a little too high in the order of things for them to do. I think that is about the last of their responsibilities if it belongs in here at all.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I am very much concerned. You are putting quite a responsibility on the Watch Committee. Your phrasing in there tends to protect them a little bit, but nevertheless when it comes to the final analysis, you are putting on them quite a burden. They have to be pretty thoroughly involved in the estimating business to live up to this responsibility, it seems to me, and I believe what we want to do is get them out or keep them out of the estimating business but have them make use of the estimates as required.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Mr. Chairman, my thoughts are along the same line. It seems to me there is a possibility we might introduce the requirement that they are responsible for reviewing all estimates and insure that whenever they do become or tend to be obsolescent that they would be -- the Watch Committee would be -- the group that would have to spark plug the initiation of a new estimate.

MR. TRUEHEART: I wouldn't want to give them that much --

CAPTAIN ELLER: I know, and I don't either, and I just felt that it would be particularly desirable to indicate just how far we wanted to go in that.

MR. SHELDON: You see, your intent as I would interpret it is that you do not leave the watch function in a position where it cannot . . . That is what you really want to bridge, that gap, and perhaps this says it a little too strongly.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Well, the question I had, wouldn't we still have the privilege at any time we found indications did disclose that a national estimate was out of date that we could now recommend to the IAC that such initiation of a new study be made? I mean I just wondered. Your idea of putting it in there was to eliminate the possibility that we might become an estimating body. That is one angle to it. This might add, it seems to me, a tremendous responsibility to the Watch Committee to insure that all the national studies are current.

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MR. TRUEHEART: I certainly don't want to do that.

CAPTAIN ELLER: No.

MR. TRUEHEART: And I agree that as the Watch Committee is now operating there is nothing to prevent their making such a recommendation to the IAC if they see fit to do so.

MR. SHELDON: Well, that was my first thought in suggesting that it might be part of the instruction to the lower level, but, on the other hand, the recommendatory channel would be through the Watch Committee itself and by making . . . for it stands out perhaps a little more than you intended it to stand out.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Who is responsible now, Mr. Chairman, that new estimates be initiated?

MR. TRUEHEART: The IAC I would say, wouldn't you?

MR. SHELDON: Well, there are all kinds of areas where they can be initiated, but statistically I believe the NSC has been by far the greatest initiator, but that doesn't preclude almost anyone coming up with a bright idea and saying, "Look, for heaven sake, we haven't got this aspect covered," but statistically I happen to know the statistics on that. It is a measure of 90% or more have been initiated from the NSC level.

MR. TRUEHEART: Also the IAC reviews periodically the program for National Estimates, and by approving it, I think they indicate they don't see the need for any additional ones.

MR. SHELDON: Of course, there is also the internal technique of post-mortem which has been working a great deal better than it did several years ago, which in itself is a catalyst for new ideas, although I do think we can write this thing in a manner which doesn't lay it on as too great a responsibility. I think these few recommendations as appropriate, it doesn't seem to me that that sticks you with the basic responsibility for initiating revision or new estimate.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Then probably the Watch Committee should only concern itself with estimates that would further itself or assist it in --

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MR. SHELDON: -- the discharge of its --

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes. Might in the functions when we get into the collection aspects of the Watch Committee, might we not more appropriately put this in there and still carry the thought that you have in mind?

MR. TRUEHEART: I will tell you I don't feel too strongly about it one way or the other, and I would be glad to go along with whatever is agreeable on it. I see the dangers that you are worrying about.

MR. SHELDON: What do you think, Millard, about this?

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I just have a sensing that you are trying to prevent this body from becoming an estimating body, and I think that if that is really your main purpose we can do that in some other way.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, it is not my main purpose, and I don't think that the way we are proceeding there is any real danger of that, the thing becoming an estimating body. I just thought it might be helpful to the NSC to have this distinction pointed out. I have no hidden purpose in this thing, and I can demonstrate that best by indicating. If you just want to forget about it, that would suit me too, but I do think it is something that I personally think is a worthwhile function to single out for the Committee.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, to get back to this point, personally I don't think the body should be an estimating body, but it hasn't worried me in the least because I don't think there is a chance in the world it is going to become one, but if that is the primary purpose, I think this other thought can be put in there in some place.

MR. SHELDON: As a guideline.

GENERAL LEWIS: As a guideline, and yet if you raise the issue you are going to have to qualify it to be sure that it doesn't start something that we really weren't too worried about in the first place, you see. As a matter of fact, I think you can get into maybe more trouble by putting the thing in there than leaving it out; yet if you really believe they should review such studies that come to their attention anyhow in the course of their business, at least consider the studies and make recommendations on them, if they think somebody ought to do something about them, I think that is all right,

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but I think you are going to have a very definite problem holding that to exactly the degree that you want it without it getting out of hand and without it stimulating something that you don't want. So frankly unless you feel right strongly about it my thought is that maybe we would be better off to skip it.

MR. TRUEHEART: What about my taking it home and seeing if I can come up with something which will be clean-cut and which will avoid what is concerning you, and if I don't --

GENERAL LEWIS: Good.

MR. TRUEHEART: -- drop it, and if I do give you another shot at it . . .

MR. SHELDON: In effect the asterisk on our Mission disclaims any estimative responsibility. It isn't so spelled out, but it is so all-inclusive that it takes the watch function out of the estimating game as an intelligence activity of a component of the IAC. That was really one of the reasons we put that in there.

CAPTAIN ELLER: Just one point, and I think General Willems will bear me out on it. If he was not careful in a number of different meetings it would be very easy for the Watch Committee to get into a certain phase of estimations. There is a tendency, and it is natural, I think, to intermingle a study of intentions with the next phase of not a detailed evaluation or estimate, but a consideration certainly of what will follow, and I think General Willems has been particularly watchful to avoid letting it unintentionally get into the duties of the Watch Committee.

MR. SHELDON: All of us have that problem. In our publications we have to be as careful as we possibly can. It was one of those things where sometimes ONE and ourselves have a few words anyway. It is awfully difficult when you make a comment on something to stay out of the estimating game.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I certainly agree with our spelling it out any way anyone wants to keep them out of the estimating business because I think it is very dangerous if the Watch Committee gets into it.

MR. SHELDON: Well, we could incorporate that. We could incorporate a direct statement, an affirmative statement, that it is not the business, not the part of the watch function, to engage in the estimating game. We

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are where appropriate recommendations from time to time may be made to the IAC with respect to initiating or bringing up to date estimates . . . you can handle it that way, and then you get both sides of the coin.

GENERAL LEWIS: You are still generating a review which is a good point, and unless you make it clear that you don't intend to review them all, that it is only in the casual use of these things that you intend them, to even look at them, you see --

MR. TRUEHEART: If you put it the way Mr. Sheldon did there I think you eliminate the possibility.

MR. SHELDON: You eliminate the possibility they are not in that business, and then from time to time may make recommendation which appears an estimate was out of date or one that simply hadn't been written.

GENERAL LEWIS: And yet you still have left a hole there of how far you intend them to go, you see, and some enthusiastic eager beaver is very likely to say, "O.K., now how can I do the job without reviewing all of these things?" you see. You don't intend that, and the only way you can do there is to spell it out as to what you do intend if you put it in at all.

MR. SHELDON: If you get an eager beaver like that, well, then the Chairman of the Watch Committee says simply, "Look here, this isn't your business". Isn't that the way it would work?

GENERAL WILLEMS: I suppose you would like to get him over in CIA, wouldn't you?

MR. SHELDON: Candidate for ONE.

MR. KUERTZ: It has been my observation that the present watch mechanism has handled that very capably, and there has been at least one occasion when a situation arose in which General Willems did call the IAC's attention to a possible relook at one of the estimates, and I think this is automatic even in the present system that it will come out the way you intend it by this bill.

MR. TRUEHEART: There are a number of people who are responsible for recommending new estimates. Each member of the IAC is responsible for recommending a new estimate if he sees the need for it, and yet there is no formal

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injunction to them to do so. Does anybody feel that there is any real need to put this on the Watch Committee formally?

CAPTAIN ELLER: In thinking what you said, I feel there might be the need for a group that would do exactly what you have outlined, but it would be a rather large job, and to tie that in with the Watch Committee function, it would seem to me to be undesirable. In other words, there may be the need. I ask the question as to just who was responsible for initiating these reviews, and it may not be pinned down, and maybe the IAC would like to have it pinned down, but it would certainly increase the duties of the Watch Committee and the work tremendously in my estimation because you would then be responsible for all estimates to be timely reviewed and the necessary implementation to revise.

MR. SHELDON: I think that is the wrong place for that function.

MR. TRUEHEART: I certainly didn't mean that.

CAPTAIN ELLER: You have an excellent point though that there is a need for such a Committee.

CAPTAIN LAYTON: Well, if there is it is outside the purview of the Watch Committee.

MR. TRUEHEART: I am not sure of that. You can pass that up.

MR. SHELDON: All right. Now shall we pass on to thoughts that you all may have on the organizational features? Do you want to touch on them first or do you want to touch on the responsibilities first? Who would like to start the ball rolling on this one?

GENERAL WILLEMS: I have something written out in the event I don't . . . I am not prepared to distribute anything.

MR. SHELDON: Maybe that would form a helpful basis for the discussion.

GENERAL WILLEMS: All right. In talking it over with my people we felt that the first statement in this part of the Terms of Reference should be that "the Watch Committee will maintain an Indications Center which will" . . . and then go on to the functions, the responsibilities. It seems to me that we ought to take up the responsibilities first, and then --

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MR. SHELDON: -- see what bodies you need to do the job.

GENERAL WILLEMS: And then we may have to go back and trim down the responsibilities if we haven't enough bodies.

"a. Continuously screen all pertinent intelligence information received by all national intelligence agencies, for indications related to the Watch Committee's functions." That is kind of a broad --

"b. Request promptly an early evaluation and analysis of all reported indications from the intelligence agency or agencies best qualified to deal with the field of intelligence to which the indication belongs." That is the authority that if there is a naval item, we go back to the Navy to get the interpretation there of the indication.

"c. Arrange for a systematic screening by all" . . . My people inserted Federal here several times. I don't --

MR. SHELDON: Inserted what?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Federal. I don't know whether this is a damn Yankee that has been writing this or . . . if there is any implication in this, I don't want to miss it, you see, but I have inserted "national" here. It reads:

"national intelligence agencies of intelligence information received by them by any means for the purpose of promptly extracting, evaluating, analyzing and forwarding to the Indications Center all indications of Soviet-Communist intentions relating to hostilities."

I think after "extracting, evaluating, analyzing and forwarding" you would have to say:

"to the Indications Center all indications of Soviet-Communist intentions relating to hostilities".

And -

"d. Maintain in readily usable form a complete and integrated file of all available intelligence indications of Soviet-Communist preparations for attack."

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"e. Maintain wall maps, charts and other display material which will most effectively illustrate and interpret graphically the current situation and long-range trends with respect to Soviet-Communist preparations for offensive action.

"f. Coordinate with the individual members of the Watch Committee the selection of indications for consideration by the Committee at regular and special meetings.

"g. Prepare draft reports of the Watch Committee meetings and coordinate the review of such draft reports by the participating agencies.

"h. Coordinate the reproduction and distribution of the Watch Committee Reports in final form.

"i. Prepare plans for submission to the Watch Committee for systematizing, energizing and coordinating the worldwide collection by US agencies of indications of Soviet-Communist preparations for attack." End of contribution.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think there is a lot of good meat there.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think it covers it at least.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I would be ready to get down to the nitpick stage. I don't know whether you have left anything out, but I doubt it. That is the only thing. I would check to see whether there was really anything left out and to maybe nitpick a few words, but it is that close as far as I am concerned.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I think that we can improve the language very definitely.

GENERAL LEWIS: Why don't we get a copy of that to work on here rather than trying to work on . . .

MR. SHELDON: I think it is almost impossible without the text in front of us to deal with it.

GENERAL LEWIS: Right, but generally I think that is close enough so that the concept is in general line with what I have.

MR. SHELDON: I had one question on what may be a fundamental concept, if I understood the proposal correctly, and that is in the realm of how much

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work is done at the Center and how much work is done back in the Home Offices so to speak. I wasn't quite clear on how that was intended to work because that would make quite a difference on the actual functioning of the Center per se and the required manning of the Center.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Would you like me to read those paragraphs?

MR. SHELDON: I would if you don't mind. That was one of the main questions I had in mind.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, it started off that this Working Group or the people in the Indications Center would screen all the pertinent intelligence information that the Watch Committee received.

MR. SHELDON: Just a moment there. Would they be getting only those items which the Home Offices, so to speak, considered or had an indications implication, or would they be able to screen a much broader aspect of the general intelligence take, and I think there is a fundamental question there.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I misread this. Let me give you that again the way we have it worded. "Continuously screen all pertinent intelligence information received by all national intelligence agencies, for indications related to the Watch Committee's functions."

MR. SHELDON: In other words, there would be a copy go to this Central Processing Staff, so to speak?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Well, I don't think it was intended that way as being completely restrictive. When I said received by the Indications Center, I was completely wrong. I think that is the wrong concept. This says to "screen all pertinent intelligence information received by all national intelligence agencies." So that can be interpreted that the representative from each agency might be screening within his own Agency intelligence on the indications or on matters relating to the Watch Committee's function.

MR. TRUEHEART: The issue, you have it buried in that word "pertinent" is it not?

GENERAL LEWIS: Right, and let's see if we can get a meeting of minds as to just what it should be. As I visualize it you want enough of a twilight zone of doubtful material in this thing so that we can be assured that we

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don't miss something of importance. Yet you do not want them burdened with a lot of stuff that hasn't any relationship to imminence of hostilities, isn't that right? Isn't that what you are trying . . . ?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes.

GENERAL LEWIS: Are you thinking about . . . ?

MR. SHELDON: Yes, you couldn't have a staff that would screen every item that came in. My God, you would never get through.

GENERAL LEWIS: Right, but the twilight zone ought to be fairly liberal, yet not burdensome, but it should have some relationship to imminence of hostilities.

MR. TRUEHEART: They would receive a generous take of raw material and not previously selected or evaluated by the agencies as I understand it.

GENERAL LEWIS: They would probably leaf it simultaneously is what you are thinking about aren't you?

MR. TRUEHEART: That is what I meant.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes.

MR. TRUEHEART: Later they might get the same item from the Agency with an evaluation on it. Is that the idea?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, at the meeting or subsequently.

MR. SHELDON: What would happen in practice is in the Indications Center there would be a flag come up on a piece of paper, and you might not have any depth of files there to allow those people to make any kind of a reasonable evaluation of the import of that item, so you would immediately or the Agency of primary concern would immediately be requested to furnish what material was available to satisfy the adequate analysis and evaluation of that item. That is the way I would visualize this thing happening, or simultaneously with the receipt of that message there would be somebody else starting to work. All other people would start working all over town on it too actually, and then the fruits of the labors that were done in parent agencies would presumably flow and be made available to the Working Group in the Indications Center. Is that concept . . . ?

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GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, the detailed analysis backup is back where the strength and analysis is.

MR. SHELDON: That is right.

GENERAL LEWIS: But these people have the advantage of receiving this information at approximately the same time, or as near the same time as possible, so that they can relate it to all other information from all other sources.

MR. TRUEHEART: Yes.

GENERAL LEWIS: Is that right?

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, I think the next one gets into that, the next paragraph, which says: "Request promptly an early evaluation and analysis of all reported indications from the intelligence agency or agencies best qualified to deal with the field of intelligence to which the indication belongs." In other words, you get the initial screening where it could be evaluated as to priority, etc., and then they go back for the more detailed analysis and evaluation of the indication.

GENERAL LEWIS: That gives me the impression of a lot of formality, that word "request", but I think that is actually what would or really what occurs; although it isn't a formal deal, it is maybe the man calling on the telephone or in some way very quickly contacting him saying, "Well, we need your evaluation of so and so."

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, or in the Working Group over there; if it is an air matter throwing it to the air man in the Working Group, and he would --

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes.

GENERAL WILLEMS: To get down a little more into the nuts and bolts of this, I should think that it would help if every agency -- if the representative of each agency -- would have in the Message Center -- in the Cable Center -- of each agency some list of items which would automatically come to him, and then those items would automatically be screened. He would pick them up and bring them over or would be notified that a cable existed, for instance, in his agency on this subject, and so on. It would seem to me we would have to get some sort of a system like that.

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MR. SHELDON: Let me ask this question. Is it true that all of the components of the IAC have today something which would be equivalent to an Indications Staff internally or not?

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, we have.

MR. SHELDON: In other words, there has to be a direct channel and a supporting team, so to speak, in the Home Office which would support the Working Group member, or members, or whatever it happened to be, in the Indications Center. I know we do; I don't know whether everybody else does or not, and your question was how would you insure that there would be the prompt passage to the Working Group as a whole of items which were immediately pertinent to that business and --

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes.

MR. SHELDON: -- from our point of view we do have our Indications Staff which would be the feeder and the playback on all items of that sort, and I am not certain in my own mind whether that is true of all of the other components of the IAC. You say it is as far as the Air Force is concerned.

DR. REICHARDT: We don't have enough people. Even though we did, everybody doubles in brass anyway, so it is a close compact . . .

CAPTAIN ELLER: It is rather formalized in the ONI setup. We have about 12 people that meet once a week, and then any item that comes in during the week is brought to their attention in their Department, and in turn brought to me, and then it goes down to the Watch Committee. If we originate it ourselves, in the event that they see an item in which they would like further information, as mentioned here, then they give a call up there either to me or to one of the other Watch Committee representatives, and there is a follow-up on it just as the General outlined. There is usually . . . maybe I would say an hour and a half or two hours, depending upon the importance of the particular item.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Now there is a field that I hear quite a bit of complaint from the Watch Secretariat on, and that is they feel now that the agencies tend to have their own sort of meeting on these various indications,

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and they select or eliminate the indications, and they never come over to the Watch Secretariat. Now we think that is a very grave danger in the Watch setup.

MR. SHELDON: I would agree with you 100%. The whole purpose of this is to centralize and have a cross fertilization of opinion on these things with a focal point where you as the Chairman of the Watch Committee can constantly be aware of the incoming material and what other people think about it.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Yes, so that there has to be some sort of -- of course, it is wonderful, I think, to have these activities within the agencies, but there must be a parallel routing of the indication immediately to the Indications Center.

MR. SHELDON: I think a Working Group of this sort would overcome that difficulty. At least that was one of our concepts. That was what we needed -- a focal point there with just that function. Otherwise it becomes a tendency to say, "You wait until a pre-Watch Meeting," and then if the item isn't terribly hot it hits a lot of other people relatively cold. If you had the cross fertilization and general brain power put on it at an earlier date --

GENERAL WILLEMS: And every once in awhile something doesn't look too important to one agency, but when you tie it in with something else that someone else happens to bring up, then it becomes more important, and we run the danger of not having or bringing those together if we have the same system continue.

MR. SHELDON: Well, I think we are all talking about the same thing.

MR. TRUEHEART: What you really need is the Message Centers in the various agencies having a routing symbol for the Watch Committee so that the material goes simultaneously to this Center and not through any intelligence agency necessarily or their representative on the Working Group.

MR. SHELDON: What are you going to do about NSA, for instance? You have a problem there.

MR. TRUEHEART: You mean because of volume?

CAPTAIN LAYTON: That is true of military departments too. If you give

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the Message Center a blanket to send all of the messages, that is fine, but this Working Group you have won't get through one tenth of them before the end of the day. There will be a million messages on logistics, and Personnel changing somebody's allotment. And you say only intelligence. Well, you are putting it down now to a generally low-ranking officer of limited experience and who is a Signal Corps or Communications guy, and he wouldn't recognize in many cases the bull that came and bit him.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think what you are talking about is to identify from the sender or else have screened somehow and identified so that the messages won't be delayed in getting to the sender, and I don't know what the answer is, but I think there is some answer.

MR. TRUEHEART: I really --

GENERAL LEWIS: The idea is a good one except they don't want all the crap. They only want what they are interested in. They want the pure stuff plus a twilight zone which is not too wide and it isn't going to get them a lot of chaff, and they want it as quickly as possible. I think that is something we can look into later, and I think this has a lot of merit.

MR. TRUEHEART: I realize that these routing people in the Message Centers don't, as you say, know a bull if it bit them, but still they do sort this stuff out every day and send it around, and I think you certainly have to rely on that point if you want speed, and then for things that they might miss you have to rely on the Agency, I guess, to turn them up.

DR. REICHARDT: Don't they sort though, in general, by the designation placed on the message by the originator?

MR. TRUEHEART: Not in our Department. The only designation that is on there is the Secretary of State.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I think that in any case there has got to be a selective process somehow, and that selective process we can determine. If it is a red hot message we can -- certainly if we tie in people around the world -- get them to put a designator on it, and we are doing that all the time for various . . . in other words, we have code words on the front of messages that mean certain things, you see, and if you have a code name

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WORK HORSE on the front of this thing, for instance, and that means that it is an imminence of hostilities item, then it could be delivered not only to the Agency but to the Center at the same time, you see. That would be without the delay of going through a Message Center, and really that is what you are trying to avoid, and it may be possible. I think it is.

MR. TRUEHEART: It probably would be a lot easier for Defense than it will be for us because you do have . . . you have got intelligence sort of sorted out in the Defense Department, and we don't have it sorted out. Everybody in the State Department is reporting intelligence all the time, and it is all mixed up with logistics or whatever else is involved.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, I think --

MR. TRUEHEART: I think it is going to be a very tough practical problem to get the stuff coming there just the way you want it, but I think we can certainly put it down as an objective -- is what we want the Committee to have.

MR. SHELDON: Well, the originators are going to have a problem. You take your PD's from our covert people. Certain specific instructions are going to have to be issued as to what is put on the wire and what isn't put on the wire for the watch purpose. It is going to pose considerable problems.

GENERAL LEWIS: In the Military coming from overseas I don't think it is going to be much of a problem because if the Far East is anywhere as developed in this business as we were over in Europe, I think anyone sending a message that relates to imminence of hostilities could identify it as such, even though it was a bit of raw material, in a way that would make it very simple to process here in Washington even though it was coming from a Service or coming from a joint headquarters, you see.

MR. TRUEHEART: Well, if it is clearly associated with imminence of hostilities I don't think there would be much of a problem anywhere, but the kinds of things that the Watch Committee considers as indications are pretty broad. Well, if they take up the Chinese loan to North Korea, for example, as an item, it would be awfully hard to tell the field or give the

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field a definition which would enable them to select such a report like that for the Watch Committee.

GENERAL LEWIS: Of course, that depends upon getting the world organized into imminence of hostilities activities as refined as the one that you happen to have here, and there will be tidbits of information which aren't going to be readily recognized that is true. They will be flowing in. There has got to be some way of bringing them forward, but the vast majority of stuff, I think, can be identified in the field, and I think it can be identified here and thrown into the pot.

MR. TRUEHEART: I think it would be a lot easier from our point of view to attack it at the receiving point rather than to try to brief everybody in the field.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think can do both, and I think you are going to find that probably somewhere around 75% to 90% of everything that comes in from the field can be marked as imminence of hostilities information, and you probably... it may be higher than that. You might actually get up to maybe only 5% which they missed, particularly if they are well along in the development of imminence of hostilities.

MR. TRUEHEART: On the military information I think I would agree, but I don't think you could say that about the political and economic stuff. I doubt if you could identify 90% of it that way.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think maybe some of that is because a lot of this comes back to you here for processing and for you to do something with, and it is not acted upon in the theater. That is the way it was in Europe certainly. There is the question of the size of the effort in the field in your line of business which throws a terrific burden on you back here.

MR. SHELDON: Well, I don't think we can profitably go very much further on this question until we study the G-2 contribution. I think we could philosophize until we were blue in the face, but I think we better have a look at this paper before we go much further. There weren't any other major points that occurred to me as I heard the various paragraphs. Does anybody have any specific question he would like to ask General Willems?

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MR. TRUEHEART: I had a general observation on the language there. I noticed in several of the points you restate, in other words, really the function of the Watch Committee, and I think it has to be avoided if possible.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I agree with you.

MR. SHELDON: I noticed that too. In other words, you could blanket it within the purview of the watch function or something of that type.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I certainly agree on that.

MR. SHELDON: Are there any other aspects of this that we want to take up at this time, or should we wait until he gets the G-2 contribution? It is my personal feeling that we ought to firm our ideas up on that before we move into any other areas such as composition, etc., of the Committee. I think it is preferable to move on step by step here. Then perhaps we shall have a short meeting today.

CAPTAIN LAYTON: I would like to raise a question to enlighten myself on a statement made with regard to the so-called worldwide Watch Committee system. What is the concept behind the words? I don't quite understand it.

MR. SHELDON: Well, the idea was introduced by General Willems in one of his preliminary presentations of the watch concept and was echoed by General Lewis in several subsequent meetings. The idea behind it, if I understood it correctly, was that to obtain maximum warning. It is going to be desirable if we can achieve it to tie in such intelligence resources as we can throughout the world to funnel back to the focal point in Washington.

The question of a communication system is also raised, and that presents a problem. I suppose the sort of thing that possibly, Millard, you also had in mind was SAC, I believe, has certain resources, does it not, with its own lines of communication directly to Omaha?

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes, but that is not exactly the same concept as I had in mind. Maybe you can tie SAC into this thing. I expect you could. But I wasn't counting on doing anything that would disturb the chain of command responsibility in any theater, but to get together with the theaters and try and see if they can't work out some arrangement for what they do to fit

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with what is being done here in various ways -- Indications Listwise, timing-wise, agree on any reporting procedure that would identify these things so that they could be quickly handled here in Washington. But it would simply tie together without usurping anyone's command prerogatives or disturbing what they are doing, tie together so that the activity here would be fully supported by what they are doing. It is generally supported now, but I think we could coordinate this so that it would be much more advantageous here and would also be very advantageous to them. As a matter of fact, I think there is a lot of advantage that they would gain, and I think they would see the advantage they would gain.

Now there is, for instance, in Europe a committee. The committee meets or has met for years since we started this thing in 1949 once a month. That is considered to be sufficient. They don't have a center. I don't know that they would care to have a center, yet they may. They may want a center after they see the thing here. We are not going to, of course, be in a position to tell them to have one, but I do think that after they see the developments here that they may be able to reorient what they are doing there to be mutually supporting with what we are doing here. I don't think we would be ready to talk to them for sometime, but I had in mind when we get to the point of asking each one of the theaters to send back a delegation to go into this thing with us, when we were firmed up in our own minds just what it was we wanted to talk to them about, and then they could go back and see just how they could develop their end of it further. I see nothing about it that is going to be objectionable from their standpoint. I think that, as a matter of fact, it will be quite welcome, so there is one thing that differs from the SAC arrangement. The SAC arrangement, of course, is what I call vertical control from the top to the bottom, worldwide, for command purposes. This wouldn't be anything like that because we are not going to have vertical control of anything out there usurping the commanders' prerogative, but we are going to be tied in with them in such a way that will be mutually supporting and mutually beneficial.

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MR. SHELDON: One could also it seems to me develop early warning assets which may not be exploited in the field to the maximum today. I would have in mind that when this Elint situation gets squared away, somewhere along the line it might be that the early warning problem could be assisted by the results of Elint being funneled in a good deal faster than they are being funneled in now. It is possible. I should think in the field of NSA there might easily be areas where one could get some help.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, in NSA, you see, you have, in general, vertical control just like you have in the SAC situation, and I don't think there is any doubt that we can tie these vertical organizations into this thing simply because it just happens that SAC, and NSA, and any other vertical organization we might have, they just seem to be vitally concerned with giving warning, or being given warning and getting warning, you see, so I think that they can be tied in somehow. Maybe on both ends; maybe at the field end with the field people more than they are now, and they are tied in, but maybe not as well as they might be, and maybe better here in Washington, I don't know.

MR. SHELDON: Is there any direct relationship

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these days?

GENERAL WILLEMS: With our Watch Committee?

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Except we usually get their Report.

MR. SHELDON: We get their Report, but there is no liaison function on a day-to-day basis or anything of that sort is there?

GENERAL WILLEMS: No, not that I know of.

MR. SHELDON: I don't know whether that might be a possibility or not. Would that cut across the command lines?

GENERAL LEWIS: I don't think it necessarily would, but I don't think we would want to cut across. We don't think we have to even consider cutting across command lines.

MR. SHELDON: It seemed to me there might be some mechanism worked out whereby on a fairly current basis a bridge

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might be helpful.

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GENERAL WILLEMS: I think we have to watch getting in too closely with them because of no foreign . . . I mean we will consider things that we can't

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MR. SHELDON: Yes.

CAPTAIN LAYTON: The reason I brought up the discussion, I wanted to be sure in my mind we are not considering vitiating the unity of command.

MR. SHELDON: I don't think there has been any suggestion along those lines at all. It is a suggestion by liaison conversations and the like, seeing if we can't improve using the tools that exist to better advantage.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I think a good example of the ideal setup is in FECOM. They have this Watch Committee that meets, and it is timed or isn't timed, no, but we get a cable report of their Watch Committee Meeting which just barely comes in in adequate time so that we are sure we always have it each time for the watch, and that is of tremendous benefit to us in the Watch Committee in considering the picture of the Far East, and I don't know of any contribution that is of greater value than that, do you?

CAPTAIN ELLER: It is very good.

CAPTAIN LAYTON: I wanted to point out there is a voluntary setup as far as I can determine, and it has no direction, or authority, or anything else set up, and, therefore, it works in fine harmony and coordination, that the Watch Committee here as a subcommittee of the IAC is without any authority to tell any of these unified commanders or Theater Commanders, as General Lewis tells them, to do anything in intelligence or anything else, that they can only be responsive through the JCS who go through their agencies telling these Unified Commanders what they will or will not do, or they will do things and are very careful from telling them how in large areas of responsibility.

GENERAL LEWIS: Yes.

CAPTAIN LAYTON: I can see where these can be tied in as FECOM is, but I can see if we start to tell them to tie in, or recommend that they tie in, that we will be beyond our authority.

GENERAL LEWIS: Well, yes, in general except that I can cite a very excellent example, however, of an informal action that the IAC took to establish

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something in Europe which has been highly constructive in the intelligence business, and that was done informally. No one told anyone to do something, but they did suggest something be done, and it was very effective suggesting, and I don't think we even have to go that far. I think we could probably try and get together with these people and get agreement on what they could and could not do, and maybe stimulate their doing some things, things maybe we would like them to do, and see if that didn't work, and I believe it would. I don't think we would even have to go beyond that. I think we would also learn a lot at the same time.

MR. SHELDON: You would have a better appreciation of what your assets were on that basis.

GENERAL LEWIS: Oh, yes, and again I keep coming right on back to that same old thing each time, and I have thought of it three or four times when you all have been talking here today, and that is in a Center like this when a tidbit comes in from one source that looks very unusual, I think that the Center's reaction is going to be, "Now let's check some of the related sources, or sources related in the area," and that is where this recommendation for collection comes in, you see. As a matter of fact, I have done that I will bet you 300 or 400 times in Europe while I was over there. You get one indication, and then the first thing you do when you talk to your Commander is you go out and you check all the various sources to see whether they have anything, sources, that might . . . and that is the reason why this Center has got to be tied in somehow to stimulate collection. In this case we are talking about stimulating collection, collection on certain things, and that if we are close together with these people in the Theater, and we are working in real close collaboration or cooperation with them, when we get one of these things, and one of the Services goes out, they will, I think, fully appreciate the importance of putting their sources on the double checking to see, and, of course, I am personally convinced that no one single little indicator is going to be all that you are going to get. If something is big -- is going to happen -- you are going to have a number of indicators popping up. That is just my own personal opinion, but I am just pretty well

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convinced that these people can't do anything big without our getting a number of little indications -- at least the little ones -- and maybe some big ones, and that, of course, is based on our having a worldwide system that can at least double check in a hurry.

MR. SHELDON: I think what Captain Layton meant . . . what we were talking about . . . was an informal system. That was what we were talking about. When you use the word "system" it has the connotation of "command responsibilities". It is a system by liaison really, and engendering enthusiasm for cooperation back home and back into the field is what we are really talking about, I judge.

MR. TRUEHEART: Your big job, it seems to me, is to explain to the people in the field what the mission of the Watch Committee is and to explain to them how they fit into it, and once you have done that, I should think you could get their cooperation in playing the part they are supposed to play in it.

GENERAL LEWIS: Of course, they may come in here and put it the other way around, but that is all right; that is fine.

MR. TRUEHEART: How do you mean?

MR. SHELDON: They always want to tell you what their mission is and how you can help them, which is all right too.

MR. TRUEHEART: We will be glad to hear that.

GENERAL LEWIS: I think we can fit the two together somehow and improve.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I think another angle to this, the Watch Committee itself is not going to set up anything, are we, for them. I think you will have to do that through what you might call the Command Echelon of all departments. You have to operate that way.

MR. SHELDON: Yes.

GENERAL WILLEMS: And I don't think we will have any trouble selling the top drawer people on the importance of the Watch Committee function. I think they are very alert to that.

GENERAL LEWIS: Nor are you going to have any difficulty with the Field Commanders. You take any one of these people, General Gruenther, it is

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No. 1 as far as he is concerned. With General Handy, his Deputy, it is the same thing, or any of the other commanders, Operational Commanders, in the field. All we have got to do is to have something that is good, and sound, and reasonable to suggest to them, and I think they would be very happy to play ball in any way that they can.

MR. TRUEHEART: As far as the diplomatic missions are concerned, it struck me that this might simply be fitted in with the weekly reporting or something of that kind.

GENERAL WILLEMS: Exactly what I had in mind -- the weekly . . .

CAPTAIN LAYTON: The Weekly they are reporting if they had anything.

MR. TRUEHEART: It is a more general objective.

CAPTAIN LAYTON: They would be in any situation that they saw that was worth reporting, and it would bear on the situation.

MR. TRUEHEART: I am not sure because I don't know the exact Terms of Reference of the Weekly, but, as I have understood it, it is a Weekly Report on the situation in that particular country. I am not sure they would feel called on under the present instructions to report say from France something with a bearing on Russian intentions. I just don't know enough about it.

CAPTAIN LAYTON: I think if they have anything in France that bears on anything to do with the enemy, I am pretty sure they would report it if they considered it intelligence.

MR. TRUEHEART: I would like to think they would too, but, as I understand, what we are trying to do here is to make damn sure they will do it.

GENERAL WILLEMS: I had in mind just exactly that, that the weekly meeting in each embassy, and I felt that we would have to go out with another requirement for the week, and that there be a paragraph devoted to the indications of hostilities.

(There being no further business to come before the Committee,
the meeting adjourned at 12:10 P.M.)

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